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Abstract 
A business cycle is, in fact, fluctuations of macroeconomic variables and gross 
domestic product. These fluctuations play a substantial role in any country. Prosperity and 
depression have been the most impressive problem in Iranian economy during the last 
decades so government and politicians have always sought a remedy for alleviating its 
negative effects like inflation and unemployment. This study analyses the underlying causes 
of Iranian business cycles using structural auto regression (SVAR) in the period between 
1965-2009. The findings of this research show that business cycle in oil exporting countries 
is affected by changes in oil revenues. To identifying how oil shocks spread through 
different variables we use Bernanke and Sims (1997) technique, imposing a set of long-run 
economic restrictions that are added to purely statistical restrictions of VAR. In the end, the 
hypothesis of the thesis verifies that the effect of fiscal policy in generating business cycles 
is much more than monetary policy and technological shock. But, bear in mind that the 
effect of technology shock in Iranian economy, in general, could not be ignored. 
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1.  Introduction 
Modern economies usually experience many ups and downs known as business cycles. Business cycles 
reflect the volatilities of production and macroeconomic variables in a country (Satyajit, 2000). These 
volatilities play an important role in the performance of economies. It is expected that production and 
employment would increase in prosperity period and would decline in the period of depression 
(Valentino and Dauten, 1987). During recession, however, unemployment and decline of production 
would lead to the spread of poverty and welfare decline as well as drop in people’s living standards. 
Besides, as controlling unemployment and inflation is among the most important economic goals of 
governments and central banks in any country, understanding the economic factors affecting this 
phenomenon is imperative. Therefore, economic planning without a proper knowledge about the 
sources and roots of volatilities of GDP will be useless.  
Six categories of theories including those Pre-Keynesian Theories of the Business Cycle, 
Keynes, and Keynesian business cycle theories, Freidman’s business cycle, political business cycle 
theories, new classic theory of cycles, and new Keynesian business cycle theories can be mentioned 
with regard to the causes of the development of business cycles in economies (Hansen, 1951).  Many of 
ideas about business cycle theories have been put forward before Keynes. Based on the classical 
economics, general condition is full employment equilibrium and, therefore, any distraction from it will 
be eliminated by the spontaneous performance of twin pillars in an economic system. Overall, theories 
proposed before Keynes can be examined under three categories including non-monetary cycle 
theories, monetary cycle theories, and supply theories of cycles. Non-monetary demand theories of 
business cycle focus on the non-monetary factors affecting the business cycle in terms of demand and 
can be divided into two subcategories of capital shortage theories proposed by Cassel (1918), 
Baranowsky (1913) and Aftalion (1913), and theories of innovation and investment opportunities by 
Robertson (1915) and Schumpeter (1927). Monetary demand theories of business cycle, on the other 
hand, are concerned with the role of monetary variables and interest rate as the main cause of the 
development of business cycles. From Hayek’s perspective, and other followers of the Austrian School, 
during recession due to the decrease of the interest rate to lower than its natural rate, production will be 
beneficial; this will be the beginning of prosperity. Lauderdale is the first to pay attention to the role of 
fiscal policy as an influential factor in increasing the overall demand. Maltus (similar to Keynes) 
differentiates between the savings built up by an increase in profits and the savings as the result of 
decrease in expenditure cuts. According to Hobson’s view, the cause of development of business cycles 
is unequal distribution of incomes which causes saving to be more than its ideal rate. Then in supply 
theories of business cycle, that's to say, Pigou’s theory is the most important theory of psychological 
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cycle. According to him, the main reason for the creation of these waves or production more or less 
than needed, is incorrect estimation of the profits by firms (optimism or pessimism) (Gordon,1974). In 
general theory, Keynes’ concern is to confirm that product equilibrium is less than full employment 
equilibrium and from his perspective the cause of business cycle are the changes in the marginal 
efficiency of capital. Overall, Keynes’ theories about business cycle can be classified under two 
categories: multiplier-accelerator theories (Hansen, 1964; Samuelson, 1939 and Metzler, 1941) and 
Keynesian endogenous theories (such as those proposed by Kalecki, 1935 and Goodwin, 1951) 
Keynesian endogenous cycle theories. Freidman believes that business cycles pay attention to the effect 
of lags and have a monetary root (Dore, 1993). Finally, another branch of the theories proposed by 
economists such as Frey (1987) and Tullock (1967) focus on the interdependence between economy 
and politics. Governments and ruling groups take measures to improve their popularity by decreasing 
inflation and unemployment temporarily. New classic theories in the framework of continuous market 
clearing, rational expectations, and vertical aggregate supply, present two theories: Lucas theory and 
the real business cycle theory. Lucas examines the role of imperfect information of economic agents in 
existence of a business cycle.  Real business cycle theory, on the other hand, focuses on the role of real 
factors such as technology shock, oil supply disruption, change of tastes, etc. in development of 
business cycle (Walsh, 1986). New Keynesian theories of business cycle pay attention to the factors 
related to demand side by emphasizing the existence of imperfectly competitive market (Dore, 1993).  
All the factors influencing development of business cycles which can be extracted from these 
theories include factors stimulating demand, predicted and unpredicted monetary policies, political 
factors, etc. In line with this, and relying on the mentioned theoretical basis, Baldini (2005) in his study 
of business cycles of Venezuela attributed economic stability of this country to volatilities related to oil 
to a large extent.  Examining the role of fiscal policies in business cycles of Portugal, Afsono and 
Ricardo (2009) also concluded that the positive shock of government spending has a negative effect on 
real GDP leading to substitution effect via a decrease in consumption and private sector investment. 
Franken and Parrado (2004) analyzed the reaction of Chilean business cycle to shocks using a VAR 
model. The results of this study indicated that real external shocks are the main source of volatilities of 
domestic economic activities especially the shocks related to foreign capital and demands of the 
external world. These shocks are followed by the monetary policy shocks. In their examination of the 
Chile’s economy, Medina and Soto (2006) considered productivity shock as the main cause of business 
cycle. Fernandez and Hernandez (2006) estimated the economic effects of fiscal policies in Spain using 
a SVAR model. The results of their study showed that fiscal policies through increasing government 
expenditures are able to stimulate economic activities in the short term at the expense of increasing 
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inflation, more massive budget deficit and lower production in the medium term. Accordingly, 
considering the single product Iran's economy and its high susceptibility to oil revenues, it can be stated 
that the most important factor in making economy cyclic is oil price volatilities and, ultimately, oil 
revenues. It exerts its influence via monetary, financial, and technological mechanisms.  
Therefore, the present paper is an attempt to examine the existence of business cycles in Iran's 
economy and analyze the causes and roots of its development in the framework of three classes of 
theories including Keynesian business cycles theories, Freidman’s business cycle theory, and real 
business cycle theories. For this purpose, Structural Vector Auto Regressive (SVAR) model, which has 
become very popular in analyzing the sources of volatilities of business cycles and monetary movement 
mechanisms among the existing instruments, is used. 
 
2- Historical Analysis  
I. The Process of Changes in GDP during 1965-2009 
One of the indexes reflecting the amount of economic activity in any country is Gross Domestic 
Product which is the total value of final goods and services produced domestically during a period (in a 
single year). As it can be seen, up to 1974 the GDP has been picking up and after that when Islamic 
revolution happened its rate of growth has decreased to -7.3.  By 1979, the negative rate of growth 
continues due to intensified political problems and issues such as the import and export markets being 
closed. In 1980 and 1981, the positive rate of growth up to 12.5 and 11.06 is clear respectively due to 
reopening of the factories and the government being put in its right position.  
From 1984 till the end of 1988, because import and export market was closed and also due to 
the sanctions on Iran by other countries, decrease in the oil price in the world market, GDP declined 
severely by negative rates of growth during 1986, 1987, and 1988. Later on, by the government’s 
change of policies for export and import and being incorporated in the first development plan (1989-
1993), the production market flourishes again and GDP experiences a high level of growth. The 
increase in the growth rate of GDP to 12.12 in 1991 was because of the Iraq-Kuwait crisis and a 
consequent increase in oil price in the world market. Following that, from 1993 to 1995 the rate of 
growth decreased again in a way that in 1994 it became 0.49 percent. After that period, the rate of 
growth reached 8.1 in 2002. This rate declined to 3.4 due to the sanctions imposed on Iran and an 
increase in the imports from China and a decrease in domestic production. 
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Fig. 1. GDP at Fixed Price in Billion Rials (National Currency) from 1965 to 2009 
 
Source: Central Bank of Iran (www.cbi.ir) 
 
II. The Trend of Changes in Oil Revenues from 1965 to 2009  
Iran’s economy has been living on oil revenues for a long time and in this way, oil sector has a vital 
role in economy and has always maintained its dominance over national economy in terms of 
commercial activities, production, investment, consumption, providing budgetary revenues, etc. and 
based on this any volatility in the amount of oil export or in its price has had dual effects: economic 
prosperity or recession.  
The first oil shock happened when Arab oil-producing countries in OPEC decided to use oil as a 
political tool for putting pressure on the United States and the western countries during Arab-Israel war 
in 1973. Therefore, OPEC decreased its oil production to five million barrels. This decrease displayed 
itself in the form of a seven percent decrease in free production in the world. In this year, for several 
months oil price increase about 400 times. The prices resulting from measures taken by OPEC led to a 
decrease in demand for oil. These factors along with global recession led to a decrease in demand for 
oil and consequently a decrease in its price.  
The second oil shock was provoked by Iran’s oil export in 1978 with the outbreak of the Islamic 
revolution and following that by Iran-Iraq war. Iran’s oil export in October of 1978 was about five 
million barrels a day. At the peak of the revolution, oil export decreased severely and it was completely 
stopped in December of 1978. Oil supply shortage along with concerns about impossibility of getting 
oil in the future led to a fast increase in its price from 13.5 dollars in January of 1979 to 35 dollars in 
January of 1980. This considerable increase in oil price gave rise to an increase in its supply, on the one 
hand, and the other countries reduced the volume of their oil purchases, on the other.  
In 1980, economic sanctions and outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq resulted in a severe 
decrease in oil exports (from 1219.7 Billion Rials in 1979 to 888.8 Billion Rials in 1380) and 
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consequently sources of foreign exchange became really limited. In 1982, owing to a relative mitigation 
of the problems related to oil export, foreign exchange earnings improved to a certain extent. In this 
year, these earnings rose from 12.5 Billion Rials to 20 Billion Rials in 1981. However, in 1984, with 
the falling trend of oil price, Iranian oil revenues started to decrease and reached its lowest level (less of 
12 Billion Rials) in 1986. During the Persian Gulf War in 1989 and occupying of Kuwait by Iraqi army, 
the level of oil supply and export decreased quickly in the world markets. At the end of this year, world 
crude oil price rose from 16 dollars to 36 dollars a barrel.  
Asian financial crisis in 1996 also had an influence on OPEC’s oil production. Low demand and 
OPEC’s unwillingness to decrease its production quotas once more exacerbate the decrease in oil prices 
in 1997. While world demand for oil was not in an appropriate condition and there had recently been 
only a small increase in demand, attack on World Trade Center towers in New York in September of 
2001 exerted another shock to the oil market leading oil price to fall to 30 dollars thus decreasing 
foreign exchange earnings to 59448 Billion Rials.  
Statistics show that increase in demand was about 100000 barrels a day in 2000. But, on the 
other hand, OPEC’s increased production and, on the other hand, prediction of the continuation of this 
trend up to 2002 resulted in a lower pressure and concern about raising the prices. But concerns about 
outbreak of war in Iraq kept prices high until in 2002 oil revenues had a 43 percent increase compared 
to the previous year reaching 102626 Billion Rials. Oil for Food Program arranged by the United 
Nations for Iraq continued until 2002 creating limitations in oil supply.  
2005 was a turning point in the history of world oil. In this year, oil price exceeded 50 dollars a 
barrel. Norway oil industry workers and sabotage in the pipeline and oil production stop warning in 
Nigeria can be mentioned as some of the causes of this high increase. In late August of 2004, Katrina 
Hurricane swept through the Mexican Gulf and oil price exceeded 70 dollars a barrel. Therefore, Iran’s 
oil revenues exceeded 150400 Billion Rials. In 12
th
 of September in 2007, the sharp decline in 
America’s oil reserves led oil price to become 80 dollars a barrel following the decreased interest rate 
in this country which caused oil price to rise to 95 dollars per barrel. In January of 2008, violations in 
Nigeria and the likely decrease in America’s oil reserves, oil price became 100 dollars. At the end of 
this year, with a decrease in American oil reserves, OPEC’s decision to maintain its oil production 
ceiling, positive economic growth in China, depreciation of the dollar, and also disruption in Nigeria’s 
oil production increased oil price to 135 dollars. Therefore, oil revenues reached 173519 and 215650 
Billion Rials in 2007 and 2008 respectively.  
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Fig. 2. Oil Income in Rials during 1965-2009 
 
Source: Central Bank of Iran (www.cbi.ir) 
 
3- Empirical Results 
During the last four decades, Iran’s GDP has experienced many ups and downs in a way that internal 
and external factors have had an important role in its direction. Oil revenues are in fact the major cause 
of the development of business cycles. Oil is the most important export good in Iran and the major part 
of foreign exchange earnings and a major part of the country’s budget is provided by revenues from oil 
export. Therefore, oil revenues practically influence fiscal policies and along with it fiscal policies are 
also influenced. Besides, enhancing efficiency of total production factors can be affected by importing 
intermediate and capital goods from advanced countries or by foreign investment. Therefore, in this 
study it is hypothesized that business cycles in Iran are influenced by fiscal and monetary policies and 
technology shock. Structural Vector Auto Regressive (SVAR) model has five variables including GDP, 
government expenditures (TGC), as an index of fiscal policies, money supply (M1), as an index of 
monetary policy, importing intermediate and capital goods (IM), and oil revenues (OIL) as an 
exogenous factor. The time range of this study was from 1965 to 2009 in an annual basis. In analyzing 
VAR, an important issue is the identification of the shocks of every equation from the residuals of 
reduced forms. For this purpose, in experimental literature on VAR models, different solutions have 
been suggested. For example, Sims (1997) suggested using a form of a lower triangular matrix. The 
problem with this method is that results are sensitive to the order of variables. Another approach for 
identification structural shocks is to use structural restrictions or the well-known model of Structural 
Vector Auto Regressive used in the present study. The main feature of SVAR models is their focus on 
the role of shocks in dynamicity of a model for the purpose of identification.  
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In the structural VAR approach, no restrictions are imposed on the structure of lags. These 
patterns clearly have an economic logic for taking these restrictions into account. With regard to GDP, 
it can be stated that based on the previous studies on Iranian economy, this variable is almost 
influenced by all the variables of the model but the money supply (M1) due to neutrality of money. On 
the other hand, considering the mechanisms of the government and the central bank for spending the oil 
revenues, the government provides the central bank with the foreign exchange earnings and following 
that central bank injects national currency into the economy in the form of capital and current budgets. 
Furthermore, due to the prominent role of the government in Iran's economic environment, the 
relationship between technology imports and government expenditures seems to be logical. 
Considering the restrictions mentioned above, structural equations between shocks of the VAR model 
and structural shocks will be as follows:  
(1)       GDPIMTGCGDP UCUCUC  )7()2()1( 
 (2)       11)5()3( MMTGC UCUC  
 (3)         IMMTGC UCUC  1)6()4( 
The results of estimation of SVAR matrix coefficients have been presented in Table 1. Based on 
the table, the mark of all the coefficients is as predicted and all the coefficients are meaningful in the 
long term at 0.5 level of significance.  
Table 1. The Results of SVAR Model 
     
      Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     C(1) 0.113322 0.017268 6.562411 0.0000 
C(2) 0.329356 0.035936 9.165151 0.0000 
C(3) 0.109455 0.016969 6.450372 0.0000 
C(4) 0.645039 0.070380 9.165151 0.0000 
C(5) 1.189190 0.129751 9.165151 0.0000 
C(6) 0.821446 0.106661 7.701486 0.0000 
C(7) 0.078123 0.008524 9.165151 0.0000 
Log likelihood   161.3932    
LR test for over-identification:    
Chi-square(3)   1.877938  Probability  0.5981 
Source: Research Findings 
Based on the 
2 χ  statistics, the hypothesis related to testing over-identified-level restrictions is 
not rejected at 0.5 level of significance. Therefore, it can be accepted that the identified restrictions for 
the system are all valid and are not extra restrictions which are limiting for the system. Considering the 
fact that the SVAR system has appropriate statistical characteristics and that the mark of all the 
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coefficients are consistent with theoretical expectations, the shocks resulting from the system can be 
interpreted as the structural shocks of each equation and response-impulse functions of the system can 
be stipulated based on them. According to the research hypothesis, the main source of the shocks is oil 
revenues, but the main direction of transfer of these shocks is via the government’s budget, money 
supply (M1) and technology imports. Therefore, response functions will be stipulated by including 
shocks of government expenditures, money and technology. The shocks of the above graphs are 
indicative of the reaction of GDP to the shocks resulting from variables of the system. It can be 
observed that monetary shocks act as anti-production due to the inflation-producing effects they have. 
Besides, the main cause of the negative effects of technology on GDP can be the low efficiency of 
capital in Iran and unprincipled maintenance inconsistent with the standards. 
Fig. 1. Response Stimulus Functions 
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Source: Research Findings 
 
Furthermore, analysis of variance decomposition determines the relative importance of any of the 
shocks affecting the product fluctuations.  
Table 2. Analysis of variance of GDP 
Period S.E. Shock1 Shock2 Shock3 Shock4 
1 0.049025 32.40660 25.19224 20.05322 22.34794 
2 0.076776 24.15667 40.98091 16.44545 18.41697 
3 0.093049 20.58537 45.56956 19.20795 14.63712 
4 0.099457 19.75989 46.97608 20.13511 13.12892 
5 0.100922 19.91694 46.75026 20.31363 13.01917 
10 
 
6 0.101342 20.11875 46.36899 20.15043 13.36183 
7 0.102168 20.03077 45.95800 20.41419 13.59705 
8 0.103201 19.79488 45.41000 21.25766 13.53745 
9 0.104085 19.55746 44.83567 22.27117 13.33569 
10 0.104732 19.36029 44.36506 23.09804 13.17661 
11 0.105177 19.20957 44.03493 23.65410 13.10140 
12 0.105474 19.10288 43.82463 24.00373 13.06877 
13 0.105673 19.03098 43.69722 24.22572 13.04608 
14 0.105807 18.98356 43.61878 24.37116 13.02650 
15 0.105894 18.95314 43.56732 24.46761 13.01193 
16 0.105948 18.93442 43.53231 24.53026 13.00300 
17 0.105981 18.92330 43.50891 24.56943 12.99836 
18 0.106001 18.91678 43.49379 24.59330 12.99613 
19 0.106013 18.91289 43.48413 24.60811 12.99487 
20 0.106021 18.91043 43.47778 24.61792 12.99387 
21 0.106027 18.90872 43.47334 24.62498 12.99296 
22 0.106031 18.90740 43.46999 24.63047 12.99214 
23 0.106034 18.90632 43.46731 24.63494 12.99143 
24 0.106037 18.90541 43.46509 24.63868 12.99082 
25 0.106039 18.90462 43.46322 24.64185 12.99031 
26 0.106041 18.90394 43.46161 24.64459 12.98986 
27 0.106043 18.90335 43.46022 24.64696 12.98948 
28 0.106045 18.90282 43.45901 24.64903 12.98914 
29 0.106046 18.90236 43.45796 24.65084 12.98884 
30 0.106047 18.90196 43.45704 24.65243 12.98857 
  Factorization: Structural                           
  Source: Research Findings  
In the first period, 25 percent of the GDP changes were related to fiscal policies, 20 percent 
caused by monetary policies, 22 percent due to technology shock, and 32 percent was attributable to 
other factors which are latent in the structure of the GDP itself. During the time, the share of the shock 
caused by financial and monetary policy in the changes in GDP increased and the role of other factors 
became less significant. Overall, it can be stated that in this model monetary and financial variables 
have been collectively able to explain 70 percent of the volatilities created in Iran’s GDP, but they 
make the largest contribution to explaining economic volatilities of government expenditures.  
  
4- Conclusion  
The findings from the model show that this model can best explain the causes of shaping of business 
cycles in Iran. Furthermore, the results confirm previous studies in terms of the nature of business 
cycles due to fiscal policy in developing countries. The overall conclusion of the model developed for 
Iran’s economy is indicative of the fact that although both political tools, i.e., both fiscal and monetary 
policies have a more influential role in creation of business cycles, but the shocks to the fiscal tools 
(fiscal policy-making) have the largest effect on GDP changes and changes in fiscal policies have a 
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higher explanatory power compared than monetary policies. And importing investment and 
intermediate goods act as a channel for transferring technology and considering the structural problems 
afflicting the Iranian economy and its susceptibility to the importing these goods, they affect 
development of business cycles. Based on these findings, as a policy recommendation it can be stated 
that supervision over how to fix government’s budget deficit, improving the taxation system for the 
purpose of decreasing government’s dependence on oil revenues and overall decreasing the 
vulnerability of long-term economic growth to volatility of foreign exchange earnings (caused by the 
dominance of oil revenues over fiscal policies and government’s monetary measures) can help to 
control the undesirable effects of oil shocks on the country’s economy. 
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